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A Ab bs st tr ra ac ct t
This paper briefly summarizes the results presented in Claessens, Köse and Terrones
(2008a, 2008b) to provide a set of basic stylized facts about the linkages between macroeco-
nomic and financial variables during recessions and episodes of financial stress, including the
periods of credit crunches and asset (house and equity) price busts. The analysis employs a
comprehensive database of key macroeconomic and financial variables for 21 OECD countries
over the 1960-2007 period. The results indicate that recessions following periods of financial
stress are often longer and deeper than other recessions are. The paper concludes with a short
discussion of the implications of its findings for the current crisis.  
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Ö Öz ze et t   - -   F Fi in na an ns sa al l   S St tr re es s   v ve e   E Ek ko on no om mi ik k   A Ak kt ti iv vi it te e
Makroekonomik ve finansal de¤iﬂkenlerin, ekonomik durgunluk ve finansal stres dönemle-
rindeki hareketlerinin temel özelliklerini yans›tan bu makale, daha önce Claessens, Köse ve Ter-
rones (2008a, 2008b)’de detayl› olarak anlat›lm›ﬂ olan sonuçlar›n k›sa bir özetini sunmaktad›r.
Finansal stress dönemleri, kredilerde daralma ve varl›k fiyatlar›nda aﬂ›r› düﬂüﬂlerin oldu¤u peri-
yotlarla örtüﬂmektedir. Analiz, Ekonomik ‹ﬂbirli¤i ve Kalk›nma Örgütü’nün üyesi olan 21 ülke-
nin 1960-2007 y›llar› aras›ndaki verileri kullan›larak yap›lm›ﬂt›r. Sonuçlar, finansal stres dönem-
lerini takip eden ekonomik durgunluk periyotlar›n›n, di¤er durgunluk dönemlerine göre, daha
uzun ve daha derin oldu¤unu göstermektedir. Makalenin son bölümünde, ulaﬂ›lan sonuçlar›n
dünya ekonomisinin içinde bulundu¤u krizle olan iliﬂkisi k›sa olarak de¤erlendirilmiﬂtir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Finansal Stres Dönemleri, Ekonomik Aktivite, ‹ﬂ Çevrimleri.
JEL S›n›flamas›: E32, E51, F42
* Macro-Financial Linkages Unit, Research Department, International Monetary Fund. 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those
of the IMF or IMF policy. 
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1. Introduction
Fierce discussions have been raging on the macroeconomic implications of the
global financial crisis over the past year. During the initial stages of the crisis, some
commentators argued that the spillovers from the financial crisis to the real eco-
nomy would be limited while others claimed that the difficulties in housing and cre-
dit markets were probably the first signs of a protracted period of stagnation. The
crisis has deepened over time and begun to take its toll on the real economy as ac-
tivity in the United States and a number of other advanced countries has started to
contract in recent months.
These developments have again vividly shown the strong linkages between the
real economy and financial sector. In particular, one of the questions that has often
been raised in the context of recent debates is: What are the macroeconomic imp-
lications of financial stress episodes? To address this question, we provide a sum-
mary of basic stylized facts about the linkages between macroeconomic and finan-
cial variables during recessions and episodes of financial stress, including the peri-
ods of credit crunches and asset (house and equity) price busts. In addition, we
analyze whether (and how) recessions associated with credit crunches and asset pri-
ce busts are different from other recessions.1
Although the roles played by financial variables in business cycles have been exa-
mined from various theoretical and empirical perspectives, most of the earlier studi-
es in this literature have considered the topics of business cycle, credit and asset pri-
ces in isolation or independently. Moreover, existing studies have looked mostly at
one country and/or a limited number of cases. We first provide a brief review of this
literature. Then, we briefly describe our dataset, which covers a large sample of co-
untries over a long period of time, and our empirical methodology. This is followed
by a discussion of our main findings. We conclude with a short analysis of our fin-
dings in the context of the current crisis.
2. What do we know?
The question of how small shocks can lead to relatively large fluctuations in ag-
gregate economic activity has preoccupied economists for a long time.2 For the last
two decades, much of the research and policy focus has been on the links between
the real and financial variables. It has been found that initially small, real (or finan-
cial) sector shocks can be amplified through changes in financial markets, a pheno-
menon that has often been called “financial accelerator”. Theory has provided va-
(1) This article is based on our presentation at the 2008 BRSA conference and summarizes some of
the findings reported in Claessens, Köse and Terrones (2008a and 2008b).
(2) Business cycle analysis is a long-standing part of economics and one of the first reviews of this litera-
ture dates back to 1936 (see Hansen, Boddy and Langum, 1936). That paper already starts with: “It
is, of course, quite impossible, within the scope of a brief article, to present any adequate analysis of
the voluminous literature on business-cycle theory that has appeared in the last two years.”13 Financial Stress and Economic Activity
rious ways of explaining this pattern and empirical research has documented some
of the channels through which real and financial markets interact. 
For example, financial and macroeconomic variables closely interact through we-
alth and substitution effects, and through the impact on the balance sheets of firms
and households. Asset (house and equity) prices will exert a direct influence on the
real economy by affecting the net worth of their owners. Households who hold as-
sets become richer during an asset-price boom and will normally increase their con-
sumption spending because of wealth effects. In addition, higher net worth will re-
lease (to varying degrees) some households’ financing constraints and allow them
to increase spending through more borrowing. 
Similarly, asset prices also affect corporate balance sheets, with effects on firms’
access to external financing. Rising prices for assets and generally increased pros-
pects in the upswing of a business cycle raise the net worth of companies. The va-
lue of the assets that a borrower owns, especially property, plants and equipment,
is an important determinant of his or her creditworthiness. Collateral that caries a
higher value provides the lender with a high recovery rate in the event of a default
and foreclosure on a secured debt, which makes lending less risky and more gene-
rously available. Moreover, in the context of information asymmetries and principal
agent issues, a higher net worth reduces moral hazard concerns, allowing lenders
to provide more financing.3
These effects can operate at the individual firm (and household) level, but becau-
se of firms’ (and households’) interactions in real and financial markets, they can al-
so create economy-wide effects that can take on dynamic, procyclical patterns. Im-
portant models with these general equilibrium dynamics include Kiyotaki and Moo-
re (1997) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989), followed by many others that also ha-
ve dynamics which resemble Fisher’s (1933) debt-deflation idea. In a nutshell, the
idea can be summarized as follows: During an asset-price boom, the creditworthi-
ness of borrowers rises, banks and other financial intermediaries become more wil-
ling to lend, and the interest rates at which borrowers can borrow decline because
of lower risk spreads and moderation in the extent of principal agent problems. Bu-
siness investment increases as firms take advantage of the relatively lower interest
rates they face and the relaxation of their financing constraints. Moreover, as asset
prices rise, households may increase their spending. 
The models have also shown that this process in turn can create further increa-
ses in asset values, triggering another round of economy-wide relaxation of finan-
cing constraints and increased (investment) spending. It thereby creates a cycle of
repeated increases in asset prices, investment, and output, i.e., the expansion pha-
(3) These results follow from a variety of corporate finance, principal agent models such as Townsend
(1979), Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Myers and Majluf
(1984) (for a review of these models, see Tirole (2006)). 14 Stijn Claessens,  M. Ayhan Köse,  Marco E. Terrones
se of a business cycle. Conversely, as asset prices fall—due to a (small) shock, finan-
cial or real—these general equilibrium interactions trigger rounds of reduced len-
ding, less investment and spending, lower assets prices, and thereby depressing out-
put, i.e., the contraction phase of the business cycle. 
There is also a large empirical literature analyzing the dynamics of business
cycles, asset price fluctuations and credit cycles. Studies using micro data (banks or
corporations) include Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) and Kashyap and Stein
(2000). Other such studies include Borio and McGuire (2004) and Pagan and Sos-
sounov (2003). Terrones (2004) studies the synchronization of house prices and the
interaction between housing markets and the real economy using dynamic factor
models. Few studies to date, however, have investigated the empirical patterns in
business cycles, asset price fluctuations and credit cycles across a large sample of co-
untries and over a long period. To undertake such an investigation, we turn next to
the database and methodology we use. 
3. Database and Measurement
We employ a comprehensive database of key macroeconomic and financial variab-
les for 21 OECD countries over the 1960-2007 period. The data are mostly quarterly se-
ries from the OECD Analytical Database and the IMF IFS Database. The advantages of
using main OECD countries are the frequency and good quality of data. Doing this for
emerging markets and developing countries would mean using annual data, a frequ-
ency at which detecting business cycles is much more challenging.
Before analyzing recessions and their interactions with credit crunches and asset pri-
ce busts, it is necessary to determine the dates of these events. This calls for a metho-
dology to define and measure cycles in various economic and financial variables. One
approach is to consider how each of these variables fluctuates around its steady trend
rate of growth. However, the trend growth rate can change over time with the additi-
on of new observations, making it difficult to pin down turning points of cycles.
Instead, the methodology we employ focuses on changes in the levels of variables to
identify cycles (see Harding and Pagan, 2002). Consistent with the guiding principles of the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), which is the unofficial arbiter of U.S. busi-
ness cycles, this methodology assumes that a recession begins just after the economy
climbs a peak of activity and ends as the economy reaches its trough. It requires that the
minimum duration of the complete cycle and its recovery and recession phases must be at
least five and two quarters, respectively. Moreover, the methodology closely replicates the
dates of U.S. business cycles as determined by the NBER. 
With the help of this methodology, we first identify cycles in output (GDP) which
provides a broad measure of economic activity. Besides for output, we also deter-
mine cycles in three financial variables: credit, house prices and equity prices. All of15 Financial Stress and Economic Activity
these variables are in real terms, i.e., they are adjusted to eliminate the effects of
inflation. After identifying cyclical turning points, we examine the main features of
output recessions, credit contractions and declines in asset prices.
4. Recessions, Severe Recessions and Depressions
We identify 122 recessions implying that a typical OECD country experienced
about six recessions over 1960-2007. As shown in Figure 1, a recession on average
lasts about 4 quarters (one year) with substantial variation across episodes — the
shortest recession is 2 quarters and the longest 13 quarters. The typical decline in
output from peak to trough, the recession’s amplitude, tends to be about 2 percent.
For recessions, we also compute a measure of cumulative loss that combines infor-
mation about both the duration and amplitude to proxy the overall cost of a reces-
sion. The cumulative loss of a recession is typically about 3 percent of GDP, but this
number varies quite a bit across episodes.
We classify a recession as a severe one when the peak-to-trough decline in output
is in the top-quartile of all output declines during recessions. These recessions tend to
be more than a quarter longer than the average recession. They are, by construction,
F Fi ig gu ur re e   1 1: :R Re ec ce es ss si io on ns s: :   D Du ur ra at ti io on n, ,   A Am mp pl li it tu ud de e   a an nd d   C Cu um mu ul la at ti iv ve e   L Lo os s   ( (d du ur ra at ti io on n: :   q qu ua ar rt te er rs s, ,   a av ve er ra ag ge e; ;   a am mp pl li it tu ud de e
a an nd d   c cu um mu ul la at ti iv ve e   l lo os ss s: :   p pe er rc ce en nt t, ,   m me ed di ia an n) )
Notes: 1 Duration refers to the number of quarters between the peak and trough of a recession.
2 Amplitude is the change in GDP between the peak and trough of a recession.
3 Cumulative loss is the total output loss between the peak and trough of a recession.16 Stijn Claessens,  M. Ayhan Köse,  Marco E. Terrones
much more costly with a median output decline of almost three times that of typical
recessions. An extremely severe recession, in which the peak-to-trough fall in output ex-
ceeds 10 percent, is often called a depression, of which there are five in our sample.
The last such depression episode was in Finland in the early 1990s with an output dec-
line of roughly 13 percent and which lasted more than three years.
Financial markets often go through a period of stress around recessions as econo-
mic activity contracts. Both house and equity prices typically decline before and during
a recession reflecting the procyclical nature of asset prices. The decline in equity prices
is more than twice that of house prices during these periods, showing the more volati-
le behavior of equity markets. Although credit continues to expand typically, its growth
rate is usually much lower, especially during the onset of recessions. 
Recessions have been becoming shorter and milder over time, especially after the
mid-1980s. In particular, the amplitude of a typical recession fell by roughly half
from 1973-1985 to 1986-2007. These patterns are in line with recent empirical work
documenting a trend decline in output volatility in industrial countries, the so-called
“Great Moderation” phenomenon.4
5. Credit Crunches and Asset Price Busts
We classify credit contractions and declines in asset prices according to their se-
verity. In particular, we define a credit crunch as a peak-to-trough contraction in cre-
dit that is in the top quartile of all credit contractions. Likewise, an equity (or hou-
se) price bust is a peak-to-trough decline that falls into the top quartile of all equity
(or house) price declines. With these definitions, we identify 112 contractions (28
crunches) in credit, 114 declines (28 busts) in house prices, and 234 declines (58
busts) in equity prices.
The episodes of credit crunches and housing busts are often long and deep (se-
e Figure 2). While a credit contraction episode last on average around 6 quarters, a
credit crunch typically lasts a year longer. Credit contractions usually mean some 4
percent decrease in credit from peak to trough while, in case of crunches, the fall
is typically more than four times larger than that of a credit decline. Housing busts
tend to last even longer than credit crunches. The typical episode of a decline in
house prices is around 9 quarters long whereas a housing bust usually persists twi-
ce as long. A typical house price decline is only 6 percent, but prices tend to fall
down by five times as much during a house price bust. 
(4) Explanations for this decrease are many, ranging from “the new economy” driven changes to the
use of effective monetary policy during the recent period (see Blanchard and Simon, 2001; and
Stock and Watson, 2003).17 Financial Stress and Economic Activity
If they are not followed by recessions, the episodes of crunches and busts are
not necessarily associated with declines in output. In fact, although output growth
slows down especially during the early stages of credit crunches and house price
busts, output often expands at the end of these episodes. The eventual increase in
output during crunches and busts is not surprising since these episodes do not al-
ways fully overlap with recessions and last twice as long as recessions do. Still, the
average growth rate of output in such episodes is much lower than that observed
during more tranquil periods in credit and housing markets.
Moreover, both credit crunches and house price busts are associated with significant
declines in investment. In particular, credit crunches tend to coincide with a decline in
residential investment of about 6 percent while house price busts are accompanied by
an about twice as large drop. The unemployment rate increases significantly, especially
during the early stages of these episodes as economic activity starts to soften.
Equity price declines vary quite a bit in terms of their duration and amplitude ac-
ross episodes, but they on average last 7 quarters and are associated with a price
drop of 27 percent. Equity busts, however, tend to last 12 quarters and result in a
50 percent decline in prices. These episodes appear somewhat less related to the re-
al economy than credit contractions or house prices declines.
F Fi ig gu ur re e   2 2: :C Cr re ed di it t   C Cr ru un nc ch he es s   a an nd d   A As ss se et t   P Pr ri ic ce e   B Bu us st ts s: :   D Du ur ra at ti io on n   a an nd d   A Am mp pl li it tu ud de e   ( (d du ur ra at ti io on n: :   q qu ua ar rt te er rs s, ,   a av ve er ra ag ge e; ;
a am mp pl li it tu ud de e: :   p pe er rc ce en nt t, ,   m me ed di ia an n) )
Notes: 1 Duration refers to the number of quarters between the peak and trough of a credit crunch or a house
price bust.
2 Amplitude is the change in credit volume or house price between the peak and trough of a credit crunch
or a house price bust, respectively.18 Stijn Claessens,  M. Ayhan Köse,  Marco E. Terrones
6. Synchronization of Real and Financial Cycles
Recessions tend to remain highly synchronized across countries. Figure 3
presents the fractions of countries experiencing the same event in the same quar-
ter and thus shows the evolution of the synchronization of recessions and credit
contractions. Recessions can be quite contagious, as shown by the fact that reces-
sions in the OECD countries bunch in four periods during 1960–2007.5 This coinci-
dence is because the episodes of synchronized recessions often coincide with com-
mon shocks. A large fraction of countries went into a recession in the mid-1970s,
shortly after the first oil price shock. The proportion of countries in recession also
rose during the second oil price shock and the period of highly synchronized con-
tractionary monetary policies across major industrial economies in the early 1980s.
In the early 1990s, recessions were again highly synchronized around the world,
and to some degree in the early 2000s following the burst of the global dot-com
bubble. Not surprisingly, the episodes of highly synchronized recessions mostly over-
lap with the recessionary periods in the United States. 
(5) Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2008) examine the degree of synchronization of G-7 business cycles
using a dynamic factor model. They report that a common factor, on average, explains a larger
share of the business cycle variation in G-7 countries since the mid-1980s compared to 1960–1972.
For a detailed analysis of the volatility and comovement properties of business cycles for a large
set of countries, see Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003). 
F Fi ig gu ur re e   3 3: : S Sy yn nc ch hr ro on ni iz za at ti io on n   o of f   R Re ea al l   a an nd d   F Fi in na an nc ci ia al l   C Cy yc cl le es s   ( (f fr ra ac ct ti io on n   o of f   c co ou un nt tr ri ie es s, ,   p pe er rc ce en nt t) )
Notes: Shaded bars indicate periods of U.S. recessions. Synchronization is measured by the fraction of countries
experiencing a recession or a credit contraction/asset price decline at the same time. 19 Financial Stress and Economic Activity
These synchronization patterns repeat themselves when we consider the coinci-
dence of recessions and the periods of financial stress across countries. Indeed, re-
cessions often coincide with contractions in domestic credit and declines in asset pri-
ces. In particular, the fraction of countries experiencing recessions around the world
is highly correlated with that of those going through credit contractions. House pri-
ce declines are also highly synchronized across countries, despite the fact that hou-
sing is essentially a nontradable asset. This reflects the important role played by glo-
bal financial factors, including common movements in national interest rates, in dri-
ving house price fluctuations. Equity prices exhibit the highest degree of synchroni-
zation likely because of the high financial integration of equity markets. However,
the popular saying that “Wall Street has predicted seven of the past five recessions”
resonates in these findings as the fraction of countries experiencing bear equity mar-
kets frequently exceeds the fraction of countries in a recession.
7. Recessions, Crunches and Busts
Difficulties in financial markets can prolong and deepen recessions through a va-
riety of theoretical channels. For example, sharp declines in asset prices can reduce
firms’ and households’ net worth, limiting their capacities to borrow, invest and
spend. This process can in turn lead to further drops in asset prices amplifying the
adverse effects of financial stress on economic activity. Banks and other financial ins-
titutions might be forced to restrict their lending activities as their capital base dimi-
nishes during the episodes of credit crunches leading to protracted and deeper re-
cessions. 
Are recessions associated with crunches and busts indeed worse than other re-
cessions? To answer this question, we first use a simple “dating” rule to determine
whether a specific recession is associated with a credit crunch or asset price bust. In
particular, if a recession episode starts at the same time or after the beginning of
an ongoing credit crunch or asset price bust, we consider the recession to be asso-
ciated with the respective credit crunch or asset price bust. This rule, by definition,
basically describes a “timing” association, or simply a coincidence, between the two
events but does not imply a causal link one or the other way.
Among the episodes of recessions, crunches and busts, there is a considerable
overlap, since there are 18, 34 and 45 recession episodes associated with credit
crunches, house price busts and equity price busts, respectively. In other words, in
about one out of six recessions, there is also a credit crunch underway and in abo-
ut one out of four recessions also a house price bust. Equity price busts overlap for
about one-third of recession episodes.20 Stijn Claessens,  M. Ayhan Köse,  Marco E. Terrones
Recessions associated with credit crunches and house price busts result in more
adverse outcomes than recessions without such events do. The average duration of
a recession associated with a credit crunch or house price bust slightly exceeds that
without a crunch or bust. There is typically a larger output decline in those recessi-
ons associated with crunches or busts compared to other recessions. Moreover, as
Figure 4 shows, cumulative output losses of recessions accompanied by crunches
and busts tend to be significantly larger than those without them. 
Why are recessions associated with crunches and busts longer and deeper? Du-
ring recessions coinciding with the episodes of crunches and busts, consumption
and investment usually display sharper downturns leading to a more pronounced
decline in output. For example, the decline in consumption during recessions asso-
ciated with house price busts is typically two times larger than that in recessions wit-
hout busts. The large fall in consumption likely reflects the substantial wealth effects
stemming from housing busts. Moreover, the rate of unemployment typically regis-
ters a larger increase during recessions accompanied with crunches and busts. 
Although recessions associated with equity price busts tend to be longer and
deeper than those without busts, these differences are not statistically significant.
This could reflect that equity price busts have a less tight relationship with deve-
lopments in the real economy compared to how credit crunches and house price
busts do.
F Fi ig gu ur re e   4 4: : R Re ec ce es ss si io on ns s, ,   C Cr ru un nc ch he es s   a an nd d   B Bu us st ts s: :   C Cu um mu ul la at ti iv ve e   L Lo os ss s   ( (m me ed di ia an n, ,   p pe er rc ce en nt t) )
Notes: Cumulative loss is the total amount of GDP lost between the peak and trough of a recession.21 Financial Stress and Economic Activity
How long after a period of financial stress does a recession start? Of course, not
all episodes of financial stress end in a recession, but when this happens, it typically
takes 4 to 5 quarters for a recession to begin after the onset of a credit crunch or
a housing bust. Although they start later, recessions often end two to nine quarters
before credit or house prices bottom out, respectively. These findings suggest that
the phenomenon of “creditless recoveries” can be a feature of business cycles in in-
dustrial countries, similar to the recoveries from sudden stop episodes observed in
emerging markets.
8. Recessions, Oil Price Shocks and Inflation
As the synchronized nature of recessions has shown, it is hard to think about re-
cessions without analyzing the role of oil prices. Moreover, inflation has been pre-
sent in some past bouts of recessions as well. These issues are highly topical again
today as oil prices have risen substantially in recent years and inflation rates have
been much higher around the globe. Referring to the severe recessions of the
1970s, some commentators have claimed that the combination of sharp increases
in oil prices followed by recent slowdown in activity together with the acceleration
in inflation could be the harbinger of a future period of stagflation, i.e., a recessio-
nary episode with a pick up in inflation. 
We therefore ask what happens when recessions coincide with a jump in oil prices
and/or a surge in inflation. The short answer is that these types of recessions are ge-
nerally more costly than those without sharp movements in oil prices or inflation. In par-
ticular, the decline in output is typically greater for those recessions associated with spi-
kes in oil prices. Moreover, consumption, residential investment and industrial produc-
tion often contract substantially during recessions overlapping with jumps in oil prices.
Likewise, periods of stagflation tend to be associated with much larger cumulative out-
put losses than those recessions with no acceleration in inflation.
9. Policy Responses
There are many ways in which policy makers can respond to a recession, credit
crunch or asset price bust, including, besides monetary and fiscal policies, interven-
tions in the financial and corporate sectors, quasi-fiscal and fiscal operations—such
as asset management corporations, changes in exchange rate management practi-
ces, and structural reforms. To keep matters manageable, and for the sake of com-
parability across the diverse set of countries and events under consideration, we sim-
ply focus on how monetary and fiscal policies are conducted during a recession, cre-
dit crunch or asset price bust.22 Stijn Claessens,  M. Ayhan Köse,  Marco E. Terrones
Policy responses vary considerably across the types of events as well as depen-
ding on the severity of these events. Both monetary and fiscal policies tend to be
countercyclical during recessions, credit contractions and asset price declines. In ad-
dition, these policies appear to be more accommodative during the episodes of se-
vere recessions, credit crunches and asset price busts. In recession episodes associa-
ted with crunches and busts, government consumption rises significantly more than
in other contraction and bust episodes. This suggests a more aggressive countercy-
clical fiscal policy at work during these periods, possibly because monetary policy is
less effective in these circumstances.
10. Implications for the Current Crisis
The global financial crisis has brought many advanced countries to the brink of
synchronized recessions in recent months. How long will the difficulties in credit and
housing markets continue? And how long and how deep will the recessions in ma-
jor advanced countries following the crisis be? If past experience offers any guidan-
ce, our findings suggest that corrections in credit and housing markets, which are
at the core of the current financial crisis, could last anywhere from two to four ye-
ars. Past experience also indicates that recessions would be longer and deeper as
they take place in the context of simultaneous credit crunches and asset price busts.
Nevertheless, the nature of a recession in a particular country can be shaped by
many factors—including the financial health of its firms, banks, and households pri-
or to the recession and what policy measures authorities employ to mitigate its ad-
verse effects. 
The global economy has been going through one of the most severe financial cri-
ses in decades. This is an evolving case affected by a number of factors. Continued
decisive policy actions at both the national and global levels could help meet its evol-
ving challenges. The evidence we report here informs the ongoing debate about the
potential macroeconomic implications of the crisis. References
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